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YI NI v. HOLDER: FORCED ABORTION’S IMPACT  
ON A HUSBAND’S RIGHT TO REPRODUCE 
BRANDON K. MOORE∗
In Yi Ni v. Holder,
 
1 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit addressed a contentious aspect of immigration law: 
whether the spouse of a woman who has been forced to undergo an 
abortion or sterilization procedure, as a result of China’s “One 
Couple, One Child” policy (“one-child policy”), has suffered persecu-
tion such that he can remain in the United States.2  The court, agree-
ing with the Attorney General’s opinion in J-S-,3 held that despite Sec-
tion 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),4 which permits victims of Chi-
na’s one-child policy to stay in the United States,5 a husband cannot 
establish persecution based solely on his wife’s forced abortion or ste-
rilization because he did not undergo the procedure himself.6
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit ignored that a husband is per-
secuted when his wife is forced to undergo a sterilization or abortion 
procedure because he is not able to exercise his fundamental right to 
reproduce,
  
7 he is often punished by the Chinese government,8
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 1. 613 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 420–21. 
 3. 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008). 
 4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 5. See J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008) (“Section 601(a) of IIRIRA defines the cir-
cumstances in which the enforcement against a person of a coercive population control 
program constitutes persecution on account of ‘political opinion’ and thus qualifies that 
person for political asylum under the Act.”). 
 6. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 430.  Withholding of removal is available to applicants who can 
establish a clear probability of persecution.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006).  To establish a 
clear probability of persecution, the applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than 
not that his life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal.  Id. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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feels the pain of not having more than one child.9  If this narrow in-
terpretation stands, it will lead to an unequal application of the law, as 
wives will be permitted to seek asylum using Section 601 while hus-
bands will be prevented from doing the same.10  The Fourth Circuit 
should have rejected the Attorney General’s opinion because Section 
601 is ambiguous,11 and the Attorney General’s interpretation was 
impermissible because Congress intended to include husbands within 
the statute’s scope.12
I.  THE CASE 
 
Yi Ni filed an application for asylum and withholding of remov-
al13 with the Department of Homeland Security in 2002.14  A citizen of 
the People’s Republic of China, Ni argued that he was persecuted by 
the Chinese government, and that he would suffer future persecution 
because of China’s one-child policy if he returned.15  He based his 
claim on Section 601 of the IIRIRA.16  At the time Ni filed his applica-
tion, a husband could establish persecution, which is required for asy-
lum or withholding of removal, under Section 601 if he could show 
that the Chinese government forced his wife to undergo an abortion 
or sterilization procedure.17
Accordingly, Ni’s application alleged that he married Ni Hong 
Mei in 1992 and fathered a son with her a year later.
   
18
 
 9. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
  Two months 
 10. See infra Part IV.B. 
 11. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 12. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 13. “Asylum” and “withholding of removal” are two distinct concepts, yet are generally 
applied for at the same time.  Asylum is a form of protection granted to aliens designated 
as “refugees.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  Asylum protection allows a refugee to 
stay in the United States, gain employment, and travel abroad.  8 U.S.C. § 1158 (c)(1)(A)–
(C).  Under “withholding of removal,” an alien cannot be removed from the United States 
“if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in 
that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
 14. Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 15. Id. at 418–19.   
 16. Id. at 419.  The statute is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).  Courts refer to 
the same provision interchangeably as “Section 601” or “8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).”  Id. at 
419 n.2.  This Note will refer to the provision as “Section 601.” 
 17. Id. (citing C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc) (finding that an 
applicant established asylum through his wife’s forced sterilization)); see also S-L-L-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 1, 4 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc) (limiting its holding in C-Y-Z- to legally married 
spouses, only if they show they were persecuted for “other resistance to a coercive popula-
tion control program”).  
 18. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 419. 
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after the birth of Ni and Mei’s son, the Chinese government forced 
Mei to have an intrauterine contraceptive device (“IUD”) inserted as a 
form of population control.19  This procedure followed from Chinese 
municipal policies that “prohibited rural couples from having more 
than one child.”20  Despite the contraceptive device, Mei was later 
found to be pregnant during a government-required “IUD checkup” 
in May 2000.21  Because it was the couple’s second pregnancy, the 
government forced Mei to have an abortion in accordance with the 
policy.22  Following the abortion, Ni asserted that he and his wife be-
came depressed because they wanted to have more children but were 
afraid to conceive another child and violate the policy.23  Ni left the 
country shortly thereafter and traveled to the United States.24  Mei, 
however, stayed in China.25
On June 21, 2005, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Baltimore, 
Maryland, denied Ni’s asylum and withholding of removal applica-
tions.
 
26  Regarding the withholding of removal application, the IJ 
found that Ni’s private objection to the one-child policy would proba-
bly not make him the victim of future Chinese persecution.27  The IJ 
focused on Mei’s medical history, specifically that the medical history 
did not mention an abortion occurring in 2000.28
 
 19. Id.  The device was inserted pursuant to the policies of the Fuzhou municipality 
where the couple lived.  Id. 
  Ni appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  Ni asserted that the pregnancy occurred because the IUD dislodged without his 
wife’s knowledge.  Id.   
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  According to Ni, he and his wife hated the policy because they “would never 
have the chance to have more children.”  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  It is not immediately apparent why Ni chose to leave China without his wife.  
Mei’s absence, however, precluded the possibility of Ni applying for derivative asylum, 
which grants the spouse of a persecuted individual refugee status only if he accompanies 
her to the United States and cannot qualify for refugee status himself.  See id. at 426 (ex-
plaining derivative asylum).  As a result, Ni had to rely on Section 601, which originally 
extended presumptive refugee status to a husband if his wife was forced to undergo an 
abortion or sterilization procedure, regardless of whether his wife was present in the Unit-
ed States at the time of his claim. 
 26. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 419.  The IJ held that Ni’s asylum claim was time-barred because 
he failed to show that he filed his application within one year of arriving in the United 
States.  Id. 
 27. Ni submitted Mei’s medical examination booklet in support of his application.  Id. 
at 419.  Showing a clear probability of future persecution must be established for a judge 
to grant a withholding of removal application.  Id. at 421. 
 28. Id. at 419. 
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decision in part and remanded in part.29  In remanding Ni’s applica-
tion for withholding of removal, the BIA noted that the IJ’s decision 
was insufficient because she rendered her decision on the medical 
evidence as opposed to Ni’s credibility and the merits of his claim.30  
On remand, the IJ found that Ni’s claim that his wife was forced to 
have an abortion was not credible because of a material discrepancy 
between Ni’s oral account of what happened—that the government 
forced his wife to have an abortion—and the medical documentation 
he submitted to support his claim, which did not show his wife ever 
underwent an abortion.31  Ni again appealed the IJ’s decision to the 
BIA.32
Before the BIA heard Ni’s appeal, however, the Attorney General 
issued an opinion in a separate case, J-S-.
   
33  This opinion overturned 
over a decade of precedent and held that a spouse could not establish 
past persecution34 and therefore could not establish refugee status 
under Section 601 based on his wife’s forced abortion or steriliza-
tion.35  The Attorney General determined that “the text, structure, 
history, and purpose” of the IIRIRA strongly suggested that Section 
601 conferred refugee status only to the person who had physically 
undergone a forced abortion or sterilization procedure.36  In light of 
the Attorney General’s opinion rejecting an applicant’s ability to es-
tablish refugee status based on his spouse’s forced abortion, the BIA 
also concluded that Mei’s forced abortion and forced IUD insertion 
did not rise to the level of persecution against Ni personally.37
 
 29. Id.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Ni’s application was time-barred.  Id. at 
419–20.  Ni did not dispute this determination on appeal.  Id. at 420 n.3. 
  In 
turn, the BIA found Ni was not eligible for withholding of removal 
because he had not alleged any other grounds for eligibility, and was 
 30. Id. at 420.  
 31. Id.  The IJ again found the fact that Mei’s medical booklet did not make any refer-
ence to abortion, noting that Ni offered no explanation for why the reference would have 
been omitted and failed to provide corroborating evidence despite having three years to 
do so.  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008).  The applicant in J-S- also arrived in the United 
States without his wife.  Id. at 522. 
 34. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 422–23. 
 35. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 521. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 420. 
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therefore not a refugee.38  Thereafter, Ni petitioned the United States 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the BIA’s decision.39
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The right to choose whether to bear children has long been con-
sidered a fundamental right in the United States.40  This right has also 
been extended to immigrants within the United States’ jurisdiction.41  
As such, immigration courts, administrative bodies that are part of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, have to address this fundamental right 
when aliens claim to have been victims of China’s one-child policy.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals, also an administrative body with-
in the Department of Justice, is in charge of reviewing the decisions of 
the IJs who sit on the immigration courts.  The judicial branch gives 
the decisions of immigration courts and the BIA strong deference.42  
When it comes to the interpretation of a statute, however, the judicial 
branch can overturn any administrative body’s interpretation if the 
language of the statute is unambiguous, or the interpretation is not 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.43
Congress, the immigration courts and BIA, and the judicial 
branch have agonized over how to adequately evaluate immigrants 
seeking refuge from China’s one-child policy.
   
44  At first, the immigra-
tion courts and BIA decided that China’s one-child policy was not 
persecution, but Congress then amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (“INA”) with Section 601 to include the one-child policy 
in the definition of persecution.45  The BIA subsequently found that 
the newly enacted Section 601 conferred presumptive refugee status 
to spouses of those forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization 
procedure.  Nearly a decade later, the BIA affirmed this interpreta-
tion after Congress expanded the annual cap of asylees that could be 
permitted under the provision.46
 
 38. Id.  The BIA also noted that no nexus existed between Ni’s alleged resistance to the 
one-child policy and the IUD insertion, and Ni’s claim that he would face persecution for 
having more children was too speculative.  Id. 
  
 39. Id. 
 40. See infra Part II.A. 
 41. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 42. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 43. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 44. See infra Part II.C. 
 45. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2–3 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc); see infra Part II.C.1–2. 
 46. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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Various federal courts, in addition to the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Services (“INS”)47, questioned the BIA’s interpretation as 
overly broad.48  The rulings of the various federal courts created a cir-
cuit split, prompting Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to address 
whether Section 601 covered the spouses of women forced to under-
go an abortion or sterilization procedure under the one-child policy, 
and he found that the section did not include these spouses.49
A.  The United States Supreme Court Has Long Recognized the 
Fundamental Right to Procreate Between Married Couples, Including 
Non-Citizens Within the Jurisdiction of the United States 
  
Although not specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the 
right to reproduce is part of the right to privacy protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.50  The right to procreate has been extended 
to non-U.S. citizens who are within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, as all persons are guaranteed their due process and equal pro-
tection rights.51
1.  The Right to Reproduce Is Protected Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Right to Privacy 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental 
right to reproduce, particularly between married individuals.  Among 
the earliest cases to recognize this right to procreate was Skinner v. Ok-
lahoma,52 where the Court held that reproduction is “one of the basic 
civil rights of man” and condemned involuntary sterilization as an ir-
reparable injury.53
 
 47.  The INS was renamed United States Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).  
The USCIS is part of the Department of Homeland Security, while the INS was part of the 
Department of Justice.  The INS services and functions were taken over by USCIS on 
March 1, 2003. 
  Many cases followed Skinner, outlining, in some re-
spect, either the right to reproduce among individuals, with particular 
emphasis on married couples, or the right to choose when to repro-
 48. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 49. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 50. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 51. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 52. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 53. Id. at 541 (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man.  Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.  The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and 
devastating effects.”). 
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duce as a form of liberty.54  In fact, throughout the last century, the 
Court’s decisions extended constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage,55 family relationships,56 child rearing and 
education,57 contraception,58 and child bearing.59
These cases culminated with Roe v. Wade,
   
60 where the Court held 
that a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is part of the “li-
berty” protected against government interference by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61  Although ultimately labeled 
an abortion case, Roe is equally significant for establishing a woman’s 
right to bear a child as part of her right to privacy.  In Roe, the Court 
reiterated that government intrusions on fundamental rights required 
a narrowly tailored, compelling interest.62
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
  
63
 
 54. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the liberty interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment supported its holding that “[t]his right of priva-
cy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.  The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by de-
nying this choice altogether is apparent”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 
(1965) (striking down as unconstitutional a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of 
contraceptives under the penumbras of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights). 
 solidified 
that women have a fundamental right to decide whether to bear a 
child, even as it rolled back certain abortion rights.  In Casey, the 
Court concluded that “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to 
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
 55. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men.  Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541)). 
 56. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that there is a 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”). 
 57. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”). 
 58. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment 
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”). 
 59. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted go-
vernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.” (citations omitted)).  
 60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 61. See id. at 153–56 (citations omitted) (holding that the right of privacy is broad 
enough to encompass abortion, and regulation can only be justified by a compelling state 
interest that must be narrowly tailored). 
 62. Id. at 155.  The state may regulate some areas protected by the right to privacy so 
long as it has a compelling interest to do so, and the regulation is not so broad that it in-
fringes on other rights.  Id. at 154–55 (citations omitted). 
 63. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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family relationships, child rearing, and education.”64  As such, Casey, 
Roe, and the preceding cases recognized “the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”65  In addition, the Supreme Court 
has continuously respected private family decisions as a realm pro-
tected from state intrusion.66
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, 
of meaning, and of the mystery of human life.  Under com-
pulsion of the state, one cannot define these attributes of 
personhood.
  These recognitions compelled the 
Court in Casey to conclude: 
67
The Court has thus held for decades that women in intimate re-
lationships, especially marriage, have a fundamental right to decide 
whether to bear children. 
 
2.  Non-Citizens Within the United States’ Jurisdiction Also Have the 
Right to Reproduce Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Non-citizens within the United States’ jurisdiction have been 
granted many of the same fundamental constitutional rights that are 
granted to all Americans.  In 1866, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not con-
fined to the protection of citizens,” and that its “provisions are univer-
sal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdic-
tion, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws.”68
 
 64. Id. at 851 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)). 
  Specifically, non-citizens are protected 
 65. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted) (citations omit-
ted). 
 66. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 68. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (invalidating a race-neutral ordin-
ance that discriminated against Chinese immigrants in its application).  Consequently, 
these rights have been extended to both legal and illegal immigrants.  See Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (“[N]o person shall be deprived of his liberty without 
opportunity, at some point, to be heard,” particularly “an alien, who has entered the coun-
try, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, 
although alleged to be illegally here . . . .”); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) 
 1302 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1294 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the clauses refer to “persons” and not 
“citizens.”69
A non-citizen’s equal protection rights are recognized expressly.  
In Graham v. Richardson,
  All people, regardless of citizenship, are thus afforded 
Fourteenth Amendment protection so long as they are within the ju-
risdiction of the United States. 
70 for example, the Court held that policies 
that denied benefits to non-citizens violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71  In Graham, a disabled resi-
dent alien in Arizona was denied state disability benefits because she 
failed to meet the state’s residency requirement.72  After determining 
that the statute was discriminatory toward non-citizens,73 the Court 
concluded that Arizona did not have a “special public interest” in fa-
voring its own citizens over aliens when distributing limited re-
sources.74  More importantly, the Court recognized non-citizens as a 
suspect class deserving of “close judicial scrutiny,” explaining that 
“classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect,”75 and 
that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropri-
ate.”76
 
(striking down a Texas law prohibiting illegal aliens from enrolling in public schools be-
cause it violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
  Thus, non-citizens are afforded the same fundamental rights 
as citizens under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the right to procreate, so 
long as they are within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
 69. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.  The word “citizen,” however, is used in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No state shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 70. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 71. Id. at 376. 
 72. Id. at 367.  The state only extended benefits to aliens who had resided in the Unit-
ed States for at least fifteen years.  Id.  At the time of her application, Carmen Richardson, 
the appellee, had only resided in the United States for thirteen years.  Id.  Despite meeting 
every other requirement, the state declined Richardson’s application solely because of her 
residency status.  Id. 
 73. Id. at 376. 
 74. Id. at 374.  Under the “special public interest” doctrine, states retained broad dis-
cretion to classify who could receive social or economic benefits, so long as the classifica-
tion had a reasonable basis.  Id. at 371 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 
U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). 
 75. Id. at 371–72. 
 76. Id. at 372 (citation omitted). 
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B.  Statutory Interpretation in the Area of Immigration Law 
The executive and legislative branches largely control U.S. immi-
gration policy based on the plenary power doctrine.77  In the execu-
tive branch, IJs, the BIA, and the Attorney General interpret and ex-
ecute congressional statutes regarding immigration.78  If the judicial 
branch reviews the executive branch’s statutory interpretations in the 
area of immigration law, it usually defers to the executive branch’s in-
terpretation of the law because the plenary power doctrine has histor-
ically provided the executive and legislative branches with the over-
whelming power to regulate immigration.79
1.   The Plenary Power Doctrine Gives the Legislative and Executive 
Branches Widespread Authority to Regulate Immigration Law 
   
Historically, the executive and legislative branches have had ple-
nary power over immigration law.80  This means that these branches 
are given almost complete judicial deference in their exercise of im-
migration power.  It follows that the legislative and the executive 
branches have an extensive power to regulate all aspects of immigra-
tion, insulated from judicial review, as a basic feature of sovereignty.81
The U.S. Constitution leaves open the possibility of such a strin-
gent policy.  Although it invests the power of naturalization in Con-
gress, the Constitution does not speak as to what authority any branch 
of government has over immigration.
   
82
As immigration law developed, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed 
resigned to deferring to the other branches of government without 
oversight.  As early as 1889, the Court held that Congress had a sove-
reign power to regulate immigration that was not enumerated in the 
Constitution.
  As a consequence, immigra-
tion law gradually developed over time through statutes, regulations, 
and case law.   
83
 
 77. See infra Part II.B.1. 
  This sovereign power was not subject to judicial re-
 78. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 79. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 80. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 
377–78 (2004). 
 81. Id. at 378. 
 82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish a uni-
form Rule of Naturalization . . .  [and] [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”). 
 83. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 605–06 (1889). 
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view.84  By the twentieth century, plenary power had become en-
trenched in immigration jurisprudence, particularly as immigration 
grew in political significance.85  In 1976, nearly a century removed 
from when the Court first introduced plenary power in the immigra-
tion law context, the Court firmly outlined its deferential doctrine in 
Mathews v. Diaz.86  In Mathews, the Court unanimously upheld a feder-
al statute that denied insurance benefits to aliens solely on the basis 
that they were not United States citizens.87
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for 
regulating the relationship between the United States and 
our alien visitors has been committed to the political 
branches of the Federal Government.  Since decisions in 
these matters may implicate our relations with foreign pow-
ers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be de-
fined in the light of changing political and economic cir-
cumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character 
more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive 
than to the Judiciary.
  The Court stated plainly 
that: 
88
Although frequently contested—many argue that the judiciary 
needs to play more of a role in the area of immigration—the plenary 
power doctrine has remained relatively unchanged ever since.
 
89
 
 84. See id. at 606 (stating that those who wish to contest the executive branch’s deter-
minations regarding immigration “can make complaint to the executive head of our gov-
ernment, or resort to any other measure which, in its judgment, its interests or dignity may 
demand; and there lies its only remedy”). 
 
 85. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13–15 (1998) (noting that, as immigration to 
the United States increased during the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Congress’s attempts to limit naturalization). 
 86. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 87. Id. at 69–70. 
 88. Id. at 81 (internal citations omitted). 
 89. There are indications, however, that courts are unwilling to abide by the plenary 
power doctrine when they find an Attorney General’s interpretation of an agency’s statute 
to be an unauthorized exercise of his authority.  See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 
476 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the framework the Attorney General established to de-
termine moral turpitude was an unauthorized exercise of his authority). 
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2.  The BIA Is the Administrative Body that Chiefly Reviews 
Immigration Decisions, but When There Is an Inconsistency, the 
Attorney General Sometimes Reviews Those Decisions, and 
Determinations of Both are Subject to Judicial Review 
Exercising its plenary power, the executive branch established 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to execute and 
interpret the immigration laws that Congress passes.90  The EOIR, 
part of the U.S. Department of Justice, adjudicates immigration cases 
and conducts appellate reviews through immigration courts and the 
BIA, which are two of its administrative bodies.91  The BIA, in particu-
lar, has the authority to review the decisions of the IJs who sit on im-
migration courts in removal proceedings.92
The BIA is comprised of fifteen attorneys appointed by the At-
torney General to serve as the Attorney General’s delegates.
  
93  Most of 
the BIA’s decisions are nonprecedential and unpublished, and they 
are often decided by a single Board member affirming the IJ’s deci-
sion either arbitrarily or with unsupported reasoning.94  This leads to 
widely inconsistent applications of the law.95
All immigration court, BIA, and Attorney General decisions, 
however, are subject to judicial review.  Federal circuit courts review 
these agencies’ decisions when appealed.
  These inconsistencies 
cause the BIA to refer particularly difficult issues to the Attorney 
General for his review, oftentimes at the Attorney General’s request.  
As a result, appeals from immigration proceedings are sometimes de-
cided by the BIA and sometimes decided by the Attorney General. 
96  When reviewing a statute 
that these agencies administer, though, the judicial branch gives the 
statutory interpretations of these agencies deference.97
 
 90. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2006). 
  The level of 
deference depends on the statute.  On the one hand, if a statute is 
 91. Id. at § 1003.0(b)(1)(ii). 
 92. Id. at § 1003.1(b)(3). 
 93. Id. at § 1003.1(a)(1). 
 94. Aaron G. Leiderman, Preserving the Constitution’s Most Important Human Right: Judi-
cial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1408 (2006). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Margaret Graham Tebo, Asylum Ordeals: Some Immigrants Are ‘Ground to Bits’ in a Sys-
tem That Leaves Immigration Judges Impatient, Appellate Courts Irritated, and Lawyers Frustrated, 
92 A.B.A.J. 36 (2006) (“Appeals from BIA determinations go directly to the circuit courts, 
bypassing federal district courts.”); Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” the Rule of Law: How the De-
partment of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 
839. 
 97. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (explaining that, when reviewing an ambiguous statute, courts must decide wheth-
er the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute). 
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unambiguous, then the court “must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”98  On the other hand, if the statute is 
ambiguous, then reviewing entities must defer to the BIA’s interpreta-
tion of a statute if the interpretation is a permissible construction of 
the ambiguous statute.99
This standard of review was first pronounced in 1984, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.
  
100  In Chevron, several federal Clean Air Act 
amendments required states to meet the national air quality standards 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) established.101  
This required states that did not previously meet the federal standards 
to establish permit programs that regulated “new or modified major 
stationary sources” of air pollution in accordance with stringent re-
quirements.102  After the agency’s entities and federal courts had con-
flicting interpretations of what the EPA meant by the term “stationary 
source,” the Supreme Court examined what standard of review would 
apply to an administrative agency’s own reading of a statute that it 
administers.103
The ensuing opinion developed what is commonly now known as 
the Chevron two-step 
 
analysis, requiring courts to first determine 
whether the statutory language at issue is ambiguous, or whether the 
language is clear when examined under traditional statutory construc-
tion principles.104  If the statute is unambiguous, it will give the statute 
the expressed intent of Congress.  If the statute is ambiguous, howev-
er, the Court will determine whether the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable or permissible.105  If the statute is ambiguous, and the 
Court finds that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, then it will 
uphold the agency’s interpretation.106
 
 98. Id. at 843. 
   
 99. See id. at 842–43. 
 100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 101. Id. at 840. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 842. 
 104. Id. at 842–43.  If the provision is clear, the Court ends its analysis and declares the 
clear meaning of the statute.  Id. 
 105. Id. at 843.  
 106. See id. 
 2012] YI NI v. HOLDER 1307 
C.  The History of the Executive and Legislative Reaction to China’s One-
Child Policy 
Initially, the executive branch found that China’s one-child poli-
cy did not constitute persecution of an individual such that the indi-
vidual could seek refuge in the United States.107  The legislative 
branch reacted to this by passing a statute that explicitly deemed a 
person persecuted if that person was forced to undergo an abortion 
or was punished for resisting a coercive population program.  The ex-
ecutive branch interpreted this statute to include the spouses of those 
who had undergone an abortion or resisted an abortion.108  After 
some courts questioned this interpretation,109 however, the Attorney 
General issued an opinion clarifying that the spouse of someone who 
was forced to have an abortion had not been persecuted.110
1.   The BIA Initially Found That China’s One-Child Policy Did Not 
Constitute Persecution  
   
Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
in 1952, effectively consolidating the existing collection of immigra-
tion policies into a single text.111  The consolidated text governs a 
wide array of areas, including immigration, citizenship, and asylum 
requirements and procedures.112  An immigrant petitioning for asy-
lum under the INA bears the burden of proving that he is a “refugee” 
within the INA’s statutory definition.113  Even then, the applicant is 
still not guaranteed asylum, because all decisions are subject to the At-
torney General or the now-Secretary of Homeland Security’s discre-
tion.114
Originally, the INA’s definition of refugee required an applicant 
to “demonstrate that, because of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion, he either was 
the victim of past persecution or maintains a well-founded fear of fu-
   
 
 107. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 108. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 109. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 110. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 111. See Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (characterizing the INA as 
a “comprehensive revision in federal immigration law”).    
 112. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (governing asylum). 
 113. Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2006)). 
 114. Id. (citing Jun Ying Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006)). 
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ture persecution.”115  In 1989, however, the BIA held in Chang that 
China’s one-child policy did not persecute an individual who wanted 
to have more than one child.116  This was true even when that individ-
ual underwent an involuntary abortion or sterilization.117  This deci-
sion prompted Congress to amend the INA, and enact Section 601.118  
Section 601, however, was vulnerable to an interpretive dichotomy 
from its enactment: one interpretation extended presumptive refugee 
status to husbands of wives forced to undergo abortion or sterilization 
procedures, and one interpretation did not.119
2.   The BIA Initially Interpreted Section 601 to Extend Presumptive 
Refugee Status to Husbands When Their Wives Forcibly 
Underwent Abortions or Contraceptive Insertions 
    
Congress amended Section 1101(a)(42)(A) in 1996 with Section 
601 to expand the definition of “refugee” to the following: 
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who 
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involun-
tary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or 
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance 
to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed 
to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, 
and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will 
be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to perse-
cution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be 
deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of political opinion.120
Right after Congress passed Section 601, the BIA interpreted the 
section to include “the spouse of a woman who has been forced to 
undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure.”
 
121
 
 115. Id. (citing Oryakhil v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2008); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (2006)). 
  The BIA rea-
soned that “[t]he impact of forced abortions or sterilizations on a 
husband and wife’s shared right to reproduce and raise children is 
such that the forced sterilization of a wife could be imputed to her 
 116. Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 47 (B.I.A. 1989). 
 117. Id. 
 118. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 534 (A.G. 2008). 
 119. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 4 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc).  
 120. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 546, 689 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2006)). 
 121. C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc). 
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husband, whose reproductive opportunities the law considers to be 
bound up with those of his wife.”122
The BIA solidified this notion in C-Y-Z-, holding that an applicant 
can establish asylum under Section 601 by virtue of his wife’s forced 
abortion.
   
123  In C-Y-Z-, a native of the People’s Republic of China filed 
for asylum in the United States after fathering three children with his 
wife.124  The Chinese government ordered his wife to obtain an IUD 
after the birth of their first child.125  He protested and was imprisoned 
for a day.126  Following the couple’s second pregnancy, the applicant’s 
wife narrowly avoided undergoing a forced abortion by hiding with 
relatives, hiding once more to give birth to a third child.127  The Chi-
nese government forced the applicant’s wife to undergo a sterilization 
procedure after the birth of their third child, prompting the appli-
cant to leave China a year later.128  In its brief opinion, the BIA con-
cluded that a sterilized wife’s husband could “stand in her shoes” and 
make a bona fide claim for asylum for issues that intimately impacted 
her more than him.129
In her concurring opinion, however, Board Member Lory D. Ro-
senberg made an impassioned argument for international human 
rights.
   
130  The BIA granted asylum, Rosenberg explained, in part be-
cause the applicant articulated his opposition to “a compulsory gov-
ernment policy that fails to respect fundamental human rights,” and 
the government punished the applicant and his wife for that opposi-
tion.131
 
 122. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 8 (quoting Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 226 
(3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Noting that the right to privacy, bodily integrity, and the right 
to “unfettered reproductive choice” are fundamental and interna-
tionally recognized human rights, Rosenberg concluded that anyone 
who refused a coercive government program was expressing a politi-
 123. C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 918. 
 124. Id. at 915. 
 125. Id. at 916. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  At his hearing, the applicant submitted unauthenticated copies of his wife’s 
sterilization certification, a document showing he was fined, their marriage certificate, 
their children’s birth certificates, and a household registry.  Id.   
 129. Id. at 918.  The BIA also noted that there was a regulatory presumption that the 
applicant satisfied a well-founded fear of future persecution under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) 
(1997), but that presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating that circumstances had 
changed to the extent that the applicant no longer had a well-founded fear of future per-
secution in that country.  Id. at 919. 
 130. Id. at 920–21 (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 921. 
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cal opinion that could be imputed to another based on association 
with that individual, especially when applying for asylum.132
3.  A Circuit Split Developed as Courts Began to Question the BIA’s 
Initial Interpretation 
 
In the ensuing years, several courts began to question the BIA’s 
interpretation in C-Y-Z-.133  In Chen v. Ashcroft,134 for example, the 
Third Circuit doubted how every spouse not forced to undergo a 
forced abortion or sterilization procedure showed resistance to a 
“coercive population control program.”135  The court reconciled the 
seeming anomaly by concluding that the forced abortion or steriliza-
tion procedure could constitute persecution because it impacted the 
husband’s reproductive rights.136  Quickly thereafter, however, the 
Second Circuit voiced its concern over the interpretation set forth in 
C-Y-Z-,137 specifically calling for the BIA to explain the basis for its de-
cision.138
The BIA answered this call by re-affirming its interpretation with 
a split decision in S-L-L-.
 
139  More importantly, the BIA limited its 
holding in C-Y-Z- in two respects: (1) it restricted Section 601’s appli-
cability to applicants who opposed their wife’s forced abortion or ste-
rilization, and (2) restricted its applicability to spouses who were “le-
gally married under Chinese law.”140 The BIA also noted that 
Congress had the opportunity, through statute, to limit the IIRIRA’s 
protection, or to rebuke the BIA’s interpretation of Section 601, but 
instead Congress expanded the number of asylees permitted under 
Section 601.141
Conceding that the statute does not specifically reference spous-
es, the BIA explained that “nexus and level of harm” principles ap-
   
 
 132. Id. at 921–23. 
 133. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 522 (A.G. 2008). 
 134. 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 135. Id. at 226.   
 136. Id.  The court further noted, however, that it would take “some effort to reconcile” 
Section 601’s language because it could be most naturally read to confer refugee status 
only to the person forced to undergo the procedures.  Id. 
 137. See Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin I), 416 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] fresh 
look at C-Y-Z- reveals that the BIA never adequately explained how or why . . . it construed 
IIRIRA § 601(a) to permit spouses of those directly victimized by coercive family planning 
policies to become eligible for asylum themselves.”). 
 138. See id. at 192 (asking the BIA to explain why spouses were eligible for presumptive 
refugee status and clarify whether boyfriends or fiancés were eligible as well). 
 139. 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 11–12 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 140. Id. at 4. 
 141. Id. at 4–5. 
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plied in determining whether a spouse has been subject to the perse-
cution described in Section 601.142  Applying those principles, the BIA 
concluded that Congress enacted Section 601 to extend presumptive 
refugee status “to persons whose fundamental human rights were vi-
olated by a government’s application of its coercive family planning 
policy.”143  Moreover, the BIA noted that, although the wife under-
goes the forced abortion or sterilization procedure, Congress was also 
concerned about the government’s unfettered intrusion into the mar-
ried couple’s private decisions.144  Indeed, the Chinese government 
sees the married couple as a single unit when it chooses to inter-
vene,145 and the law considers a husband’s reproductive opportunities 
“to be bound up with those of his wife.”146  The BIA concluded that a 
forced abortion or sterilization procedure impacts a couple’s shared 
right to reproduce such that the wife’s forced sterilization or abortion 
is imputed to her husband.147
Lastly, the BIA declined to extend C-Y-Z- to applicants claiming 
the government had subjected their girlfriend or fiancée to a forced 
abortion or sterilization procedure.
 
148  Focusing on marriage as the 
“linchpin,” the BIA stressed that the sanctity of marriage, and the 
long-term commitment it places on a husband, distinguishes it from 
the responsibility placed on an unmarried father.149
 
 142. Id. at 5.  The BIA again referenced the Code of Federal Regulations, which allows 
an applicant to establish asylum if he could show that he suffered past persecution or had 
a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Id. at 5 n.5.  Past persecution was established if 
the applicant suffered persecution based on his “race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion, and is unable or unwilling to return to, or 
avail himself . . . of the protection of, that country owing such persecution.”  Id. (quoting 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2006)). 
  The BIA ac-
knowledged, however, that there are cases where an unmarried part-
ner in an “extremely close and committed relationship” can demon-
strate persecution based on the clause in Section 601 referring to 
 143. Id. (citations omitted).  See also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that “Congress’s goal in passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for 
‘couples’ persecuted on account of an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families to-
gether”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996)). 
 144. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 6.  
 145. Id. at 6–7.  The Chinese government imposed joint responsibility on married 
couples for family planning decisions, and equally threatened the couple and subjected 
them to social ostracism for failing to comply with municipal family planning policies.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 8. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 8–9.  The BIA highlights that requiring marriage is practical and manageable 
because it accounts for the statutory definition of “refugee” as well as the general prin-
ciples of asylum law.  Id. at 9. 
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“other resistance to a coercive population control program.”150  That 
applicant, however, would have to meet the nexus requirement by 
demonstrating his resistance to a coercive population control pro-
gram and demonstrate that he was persecuted for that resistance.151
4.  The Attorney General Addressed the Circuit Split by Holding That 
Section 601 Did Not Extend Presumptive Refugee Status to 
Husbands of Women Forced to Undergo Abortions or Insertions of 
Contraceptive Devices 
 
The BIA’s clarification in S-L-L- did not convince the Second Cir-
cuit because the court subsequently reversed, holding that Section 
601 is unambiguous in that it does not extend presumptive refugee 
status to the spouses of persons physically subjected to forced abor-
tions or sterilization procedures.152  As such, according to the Second 
Circuit, the BIA was not entitled to deference since the statute is un-
ambiguous and therefore the BIA erred in its interpretation of Sec-
tion 601.153  The Second Circuit’s divergence created a circuit split, 
conflicting with other courts that deferred to the BIA’s interpretation 
in C-Y-Z-.154
The circuit split prompted the Attorney General to direct the 
BIA to refer its decision in J-S-, a case with facts similar to C-Y-Z-, for 
his review.
 
155  The Attorney General vacated the IJ’s decision, rejected 
the BIA’s interpretation of Section 601 in C-Y-Z-, and concluded that 
Section 601 did not extend presumptive refugee status to the spouse 
of a person physically subjected to undergo a forced abortion or steri-
lization procedure.156  Similar to C-Y-Z-, the applicant in J-S- was a 
Chinese citizen who sought asylum under Section 601 because the 
Chinese government forced his wife to undergo an involuntary sterili-
zation procedure.157
 
 150. Id. at 10. 
  The applicant requested permission from the 
 151. Id. 
 152. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 299–300 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc). 
 153. Id. at 300. 
 154. See, e.g., Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007) (deciding not to 
challenge the BIA’s interpretation of Section 601 and noting that other courts have ap-
proved the BIA’s interpretation as well). 
 155. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (A.G. 2008).  The Attorney General is granted this re-
viewing authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2010).  Id. 
 156. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 521. 
 157. Id. at 522.  The applicant alleged that Chinese officials forcibly removed his wife 
from their home to insert an IUD and then required his wife to make frequent medical 
visits to check its effectiveness.  Id. at 524. 
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Chinese government to have another child three separate times, but 
Chinese officials refused each request.158
In his opinion, the Attorney General first examined Congress’s 
intent by analyzing Section 601’s text, concluding that the statutory 
language refers only to “a person” who has been forced to “undergo” 
an involuntary abortion or sterilization procedure.
 
159  The Attorney 
General explained that, when interpreting the statute in a way that 
gives its words “their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning,” “a person” re-
ferred only to the individual subjected to the procedure and not to 
spouses.160  He asserted that Congress would have expressly said 
“spouses” if it wanted to include them in Section 601’s forced abor-
tion and sterilization clauses.161  The Attorney General also noted that 
the BIA’s interpretation that allowed spouses to use Section 601 cir-
cumvented the INA’s separate derivative asylum requirements,162 and 
the INA’s requirement that applicants establish asylum on their own 
merits.163  Because the Attorney General found that the one-child pol-
icy did not persecute a husband who wanted to have more than one 
child, he also found that the BIA’s interpretation permitted a large 
number of applicants to gain asylum without having to meet the statu-
tory burden of proving past persecution or a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution because of their political opinion.164
To explain why Congress did not alter the statute and raise its 
annual cap of permitted asylees after C-Y-Z-,
 
165 the Attorney General 
stated that not altering the text could be interpreted merely as a fail-
ure to express an opinion.166  As for raising the annual cap, the Attor-
ney General contended that Congress could have merely raised the 
cap because the original cap was unrealistically low and had created 
an unmanageable backlog of applicants awaiting approval, even ab-
sent the C-Y-Z- opinion.167
 
 158. Id. at 524.  The applicant testified he did not want to interfere with the IUD’s 
forced insertion because he did not want to “further jeopardize his wife.”  Id. 
  Further, the Attorney General disagreed 
 159. Id. at 528. 
 160. Id. at 529 (citations omitted).  
 161. Id. at 530. 
 162. Derivative asylum extends presumptive refugee status to spouses only if they ac-
company, follow, or join the alien that is eligible for, and is granted, asylum.  Id.  The ap-
plicant in J-S- arrived in the United States without his wife.  Id. at 522. 
 163. Id. at 530.  These requirements are distinct from derivative asylum.  Id. 
 164. Id. (quoting Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 165. Id. at 533. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (quoting S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 4 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc) (Pauley, Bd. Mem., 
concurring)).   
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with the respondent’s recount of Section 601’s legislative history.  He 
explained that the legislative history does not expressly address pre-
sumptive refugee status for spouses,168 although there was some evi-
dence that Congress expected the provision to benefit both spouses 
when each spouse was able to satisfy the asylum requirements.169
To support the claim that spouses do not receive presumptive 
refugee status, the Attorney General referenced portions of the 
House Report
   
170 where committee members advised against confer-
ring presumptive refugee status to spouses by emphasizing that the 
burden of proof remains with every applicant to establish that he has 
been subject to persecution.171  Nonetheless, throughout his opinion, 
the Attorney General noted repeatedly that his decision did not pre-
vent the spouse of a person subjected to a forced abortion or steriliza-
tion procedure from establishing asylum in his own right by virtue of 
Section 601’s provisions relating to “failure,” “refusal,” “other resis-
tance,” or “well founded fear.”172
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
  
In Yi Ni v. Holder, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Attorney General’s opinion in J-S- and 
held that Ni, an alien and Chinese citizen, failed to establish persecu-
tion based on his wife’s forced abortion and sterilization procedure.173  
Writing for the court, Judge Allyson K. Duncan began by explaining 
that the court would apply the Chevron standard to the AG’s opinion 
in J-S-.174  Under this analysis, the Court held that the Attorney Gener-
al’s interpretation of the statute was permissible,175 finding that Sec-
tion 601 unambiguously expressed Congress’s intent.176
 
 168. Id. at 538. 
  The court 
examined Section 601’s plain language and agreed with the Attorney 
 169. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174–75 (1996)).  There were references 
in the House Report and floor discussions to “couples” and “women and men . . . fleeing 
from forced abortion.”  Id.  The Attorney General notes, however, that the references say 
nothing as to a spouse establishing asylum solely because his wife was subjected to a forced 
abortion or sterilization procedure.  Id. 
 170. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996). 
 171. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 539. 
 172. Id. at 523–24. 
 173. 613 F.3d 415, 428, 431–32 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 174. Id. at 424 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984)) (determining whether to adopt an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
that it administers requires examining whether the statute is ambiguous and if so, then 
whether the interpretation is a “permissible construction of the statute”). 
 175. Id. at 427. 
 176. Id. at 425. 
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General that Congress intended only to cover the individual the gov-
ernment had forced to either have an abortion or undergo the forced 
sterilization procedure; the statute referred to a singular “person” in-
stead of a couple, precluding the extension of presumptive refugee 
status to spouses based solely on those grounds.177
The court then noted that even if the terms were ambiguous, it 
would still give the Attorney General’s opinion particular deference 
because the statute’s expressed language conferred decision-making 
authority for decisions regarding eligibility for withholding of removal 
to the Attorney General.
  
178  Moreover, the court explained that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has also favored judicial deference to the execu-
tive branch in sensitive immigration contexts implicating foreign rela-
tions.179  Thus, the court found that the Attorney General’s analysis of 
the statutory language was consistent with the rules of statutory con-
struction.180
The court also agreed with the Attorney General’s reasoning that 
automatically granting a husband asylum would circumvent the INA’s 
derivative asylum requirements and the IIRIRA’s requirement that 
every applicant establish eligibility on his or her own merits.
   
181  The 
court explained that the INA grants derivative asylum to spouses of 
persecuted individuals “if such spouses do not themselves qualify as 
refugees, but only if they accompany, or follow to join, the alien who 
is eligible for, and is actually granted, asylum.”182  Therefore, the 
court concluded that granting applicants automatic refugee status 
would undermine the provision’s implied derivative asylum by extend-
ing refugee status to spouses who do not accompany their wives.183  
Further, the court disagreed with Ni’s claim that withholding of re-
moval is a much broader concept than asylum.184  The court ultimate-
ly held that Ni could not establish a claim for withholding of removal 
using his wife’s forced abortion as his sole basis.185
Next, the court relied on the Attorney General’s reasoning to 
conclude that persecution could not be based solely on fear of psy-
 
 
 177. Id. at 424–25. 
 178. Id. at 425–26 (citations omitted). 
 179. Id. at 426 (citations omitted). 
 180. Id.  The Court explained that it would be inconsistent to interpret the statute to 
encompass two people—a husband and a wife—being able to have an abortion.  Id.  (cit-
ing J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (A.G. 2008)). 
 181. Id. at 426–27. 
 182. Id. at 426 (quoting J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 427. 
 185. Id. at 428. 
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chological harm.186  Reiterating the IJ’s conclusion that Ni’s claim 
failed to show a nexus between his political opinion and the alleged 
harm, the court found no evidence that the government perceived Ni 
as a political dissident.187  As a result, the court determined that Ni’s 
fear of having more children was speculative because it depended on 
forces beyond Ni’s control.188  Ni failed, the court noted, to show that 
he would face persecution for resisting the policies.189  Lastly, the 
court rejected Ni’s request to remand the case to present additional 
evidence in light of a new legal standard.190  Distinguishing Ni’s case 
from Chen v. Holder,191 in which the court permitted the petitioner to 
obtain additional evidence in light of a new legal standard, the court 
noted that Ni turned in his initial legal briefs two months after the 
standard changed and thus had ample time to provide additional evi-
dence.192
IV.  
  
In Yi Ni v. Holder,
ANALYSIS 
193 the Fourth Circuit held that an alien failed to 
establish asylum and withholding of removal because his wife’s forced 
abortion and sterilization did not amount to persecution of the hus-
band.194  In so holding, the court inadequately considered the in-
fringement on a husband’s rights when his wife is forced to undergo 
an abortion or sterilization procedure.195  Additionally, the court’s rul-
ing will lead to an unequal application of Section 601.196  The court 
should have disagreed with the Attorney General’s interpretation of 
Section 601 because Section 601 is ambiguous and the Attorney Gen-
eral’s interpretation was not a permissible construction of the ambi-
guous statute.197
 
 186. Id. 
   
 187. Id. at 429. 
 188. Id. at 428–29.  These include Mei’s willingness to have additional children, and Ni’s 
uncertainty of their ability to conceive again.  Id. at 429. 
 189. Id.  The court noted that Ni never took affirmative steps to violate the policies and 
testified to the opposite effect—that he would not have more children in violation of the 
policy if he returned.  Id. 
 190. Id. at 430–31. 
 191. 578 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 192. Yi Ni, 613 F.3d at 431. 
 193. 613 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 194. Id. at 431–32. 
 195. See infra Part IV.A. 
 196. See infra Part IV.B. 
 197. See infra Part IV.C. 
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A.  The Yi Ni Court Ignored That a Husband’s Rights Are Affected When 
the Government Does Not Permit His Wife to Have Additional 
Children 
By agreeing with the Attorney General’s interpretation that a 
wife’s forced abortion or insertion of a contraceptive device did not 
rise to persecution for a husband, the Fourth Circuit failed to ac-
knowledge that a husband is also persecuted when his wife is forced to 
have an abortion or is sterilized.  First, a husband has a fundamental 
right to procreate, and the one-child policy infringes on that right.198  
Second, a husband is often emotionally hurt by not being able to have 
more than one child, and by his wife’s pain.199  Finally, the Chinese 
government frequently punished couples, and not just wives, for vi-
olating the one-child policy through fines or job loss.200
1.   A Husband’s Right to Reproduce Is Affected When His Wife Is 
Forced to Have an Abortion or Have a Contraceptive Device 
Inserted 
   
The right to reproduce is a fundamental and constitutionally 
protected right that has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.201  It is also regarded as one of the most valued human 
rights.202  It guarantees all individuals “the right to determine ‘freely 
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children’” and the 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction “free of coercion, 
discrimination and violence.”203
 
 198. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
  In fact, in her concurring opinion in 
C-Y-Z-, Board Member Lory D. Rosenberg recognized that “[t]he right 
to privacy, the right to have a family, the right to bodily integrity, and 
the right to unfettered reproductive choice are fundamental individ-
 199. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 200. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 201. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted go-
vernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 202. Kala M. Strawn, Standing in Her Shoes: Recognizing the Persecution Suffered by Spouses of 
Persons Who Undergo Forced Abortion or Sterilization Under China’s Coercive Population Control 
Policy, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 205, 225 (2009). 
 203. Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 889–90 (2000) (citing UNITED NATIONS, PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, para. 7.3, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 171/13, U.N. Sales No. E. 95.XIII.18.CI Annex (1994)). 
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ual rights, recognized domestically and internationally.”204  This right 
extends to both a man and woman.205  It also extends to any individu-
al within the United States’ jurisdiction,206
As a constitutionally protected right, the right to reproduce that 
a Chinese citizen in the United States possesses is analogous to other 
fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech or religion.  
Courts in the United States find that the latter two rights are legiti-
mate grounds for granting asylum based on persecution on account 
of one’s political opinion.
 including Chinese aliens 
attempting to escape China’s oppressive policies. 
207  Like any other opinion, a husband has a 
political opinion when he objects to policies that infringe on his right 
as a married individual to choose whether to bear children.208  Simi-
larly, bearing children in bold defiance of a suppressive policy is 
equally an expression of political opinion.209  When the government 
then chooses to abort a husband’s child or forcibly insert a contracep-
tive device into his wife to infringe on his “unfettered reproductive 
choice,” it violates his right to procreate and amounts to persecution 
for both spouses.210
Denying a husband the power to establish presumptive refugee 
status based on his wife’s abortion ignores his right to control his own 
reproduction, and ignores that his wife’s abortion equally affects his 
right to reproduce.  A husband is incapable of procreating without his 
wife.
   
211
 
 204. C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 921 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc) (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., 
concurring).  Rosenberg added that “one who opposes or resists a coercive population 
control program involving forced abortion and sterilization because he or she believes that 
it is wrong or improper on personal, ethical, religious or philosophical grounds, holds a 
political opinion.”  Id. at 922. 
  When she is persecuted by means of a forced abortion, so is 
he.  When the government forcibly aborts or sterilizes the wife, it is an 
intrusive act that violates both the wife’s and the husband’s funda-
 205. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90 (1976) (citing 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (acknowledging “a man’s right to father 
children and enjoy the association of his offspring”).  
 206. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 207. Strawn, supra note 202, at 226. 
 208. Id. at 225–26 (citations omitted). 
 209. See id. (citing Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 872 (E.D. Va. 1994)) 
(“[T]here is little doubt that the phrase ‘political opinion,’ as defined in § 101(a)(42) of 
the INA, encompasses an individual’s views regarding procreation.”). 
 210. See id. at 226 (“For both men and women, denial of the choice to remain fertile or 
procreate constitutes persecution on the basis of political opinion.”). 
 211. See id. at 224–25 (citing Sun Wen Chen v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 491 F.3d 100, 107–08 
(3d Cir. 2007)) (explaining that sterilizing a woman deprives a couple of the children that 
would have been born to the both of them, and that “the forced abortion or sterilization 
of one spouse will directly affect the reproductive capacity of the other”).  
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mental rights because it impedes their decision whether to reproduce 
by using both violence and coercion.212  Although the Yi Ni court ac-
knowledged that the BIA’s earlier interpretations of Section 601 al-
lowed a husband to establish past persecution based on his wife’s 
forced abortion,213 the court instead chose to apply the Attorney Gen-
eral’s narrow interpretation, seemingly ignoring the devastating im-
pact that a forced abortion has on a husband’s right to reproduce.214
2.  A Man Is Persecuted When His Child Is Aborted Because He 
Suffers Emotional Harm 
 
Although abortion and sterilization procedures are performed 
almost exclusively on women, husbands also experience pain and loss 
when their wives are forced to terminate their pregnancies.215  The 
entire family feels the impact.216  It can be traumatic, for example, for 
children to witness their mothers, or a husband to witness his wife, 
experience the physical and psychological suffering associated with 
forced abortion or sterilization procedures.217  Indeed, because these 
families want to do something very natural by enlarging their family, 
and because forced abortions and sterilizations traumatically impede 
on the natural inclinations of each family member, it is a narrow-
minded view to conclude that a forced abortion persecutes only one 
individual.218
When one spouse is subjected to a forced abortion or steriliza-
tion procedure, it “naturally and predictably has a profound impact 
on both parties to the marriage.”
  
219
 
 212. See Abrams, supra note 
  The forced abortion or steriliza-
203, at 889 (explaining that the right to reproduce includes 
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction “free of coercion, discrimination and 
violence” (citing UNITED NATIONS, PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, para. 7.3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 171/13, 
U.N. Sales No. E. 95.XIII.18.CI Annex (1994))). 
 213. See Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 422 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (acknowl-
edging that the BIA’s earlier interpretation was largely based on the shared impact that a 
forced abortion had on a husband and wife’s right to reproduce). 
 214. Id. at 425.  Despite the impact on a husband and wife’s shared right to reproduce, 
the court agreed with the Attorney General’s interpretation that Congress only intended 
to cover the specific person physically harmed under China’s one-child policy.  Id.  
 215. See Strawn, supra note 202, at 224. 
 216. Id. at 211. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 329 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that a spouse, “while phys-
ically unharmed,” also is a target of persecution since his own health and emotional well-
being is affected by a forced abortion). 
 219. S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 7 (B.I.A. 2006) (en banc). 
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tion of a husband’s spouse “deprive[s] a couple of the natural fruits of 
conjugal life”—a child.220  Some, including judges, argue that one can 
be persecuted simply by witnessing someone with whom he shares an 
intimate relationship be harmed.221  Given the impact of China’s one-
child policy, the Fourth Circuit could not in good faith deny that “one 
has suffered harm or injury sufficiently severe to constitute persecu-
tion when one’s spouse is forced to undergo an abortion or steriliza-
tion.”222
3.  China’s One-Child Policy Persecutes a Family in Several Ways, All 
Through Which the Husband Continues to Suffer Emotional 
Harm 
 
The Fourth Circuit failed to adequately consider the overwhelm-
ing human rights violations that China endorses through its one-child 
policy, all of which are emotionally imposed on a spouse by extension.  
The one-child policy’s most easily recognizable offense is that it vi-
olates human rights by restricting the right and ability of Chinese citi-
zens to reproduce.223  It explicitly prohibits married couples from hav-
ing children.224  The one-child policy, however, has deeper 
devastating effects by committing harsher human rights crimes 
against individuals that go unpublicized.225
The Chinese government, for example, punishes married 
couples for unplanned pregnancies through a series of penalties, in-
cluding heavy fines and job loss.
   
226  The government has forcibly ab-
orted full-term pregnancies with little regard for the mother’s safety 
or the emotional effect it would have on the married couple.227
 
 220. Lin II, 494 F.3d at 330 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Qu v. 
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)). 
  These 
atrocities are not just reserved to a few select cases.  During one hor-
rific thirty-five-day period in 2003, the Chinese government forcibly 
aborted 271 pregnancies and sterilized 1,369 women to ensure their 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Megan A. Carrick, Ensuring That Federal Circuit Courts Adhere to the Spirit of the Law: 
Why Legally and Non-Legally Married Spouses Deserve Explicit Asylum Protection Under Section 601 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 
207 (2009). 
 224. Id. at 208.  Even full-term pregnancies have been aborted if couples were found to 
have violated the one-child policy.  Id. 
 225. See id. 207–08 (outlining the various methods the Chinese governments used to 
enforce its one-child policy). 
 226. Id. at 208. 
 227. See id. (describing China’s actions to ensure compliance with the one-child policy). 
 2012] YI NI v. HOLDER 1321 
compliance with the one-child policy.228  Read alternatively, the 
spouses of individuals subjected to forced abortions or sterilization 
procedures in China either saw their child aborted, or were forced to 
give up their ability to have another child, more than 1,600 times in 
just those thirty-five days.  Moreover, the forcibly inserted IUDs, in 
particular, have physical side effects, including “heavy bleeding, 
weight loss, fatigue, and anxiety disorders.”229  Although the husband 
is seldom sterilized,230 it is still traumatic to watch his wife experience 
those physical side effects.231
Even still, the emotional reactions to forced abortions or forcible 
insertions of contraceptive devices vastly outweigh any physical tur-
moil or side effects.
 
232  The State Department has estimated that 
about 500 Chinese women commit suicide every day due, in part, to 
the one-child policy.233  In one case in 2004, the State Department re-
ported that a Chinese woman, in an attempt to avoid sterilization, in-
jured herself by jumping out of an operating room window.234
These are terrible crimes that the Chinese government regularly 
commits against its own citizens, causing many individuals to flee and 
seek asylum in the United States.  They are the very individuals that 
Section 601 aims to protect.
  In 
these cases, husbands have not only lost their children, or had their 
rights infringed upon, but also abruptly lost their spouses in some-
times gruesome fashion. 
235  And yet the Fourth Circuit chose to 
take a narrow view—agreeing with the Attorney General’s interpreta-
tion that would make it harder for individuals, particularly spouses 
who have suffered great emotional harm or actual loss, to establish 
persecution under a statute specifically promulgated for that pur-
pose.236
 
 228. Id. 
 
 229. See Strawn, supra note 202, at 210. 
 230. Id. at 209. 
 231. Id. at 211. 
 232. Id. at 210. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Carrick, supra note 223, at 209 (“Congress intended to provide asylum protec-
tion to all victims of China’s coercive family planning policy by amending [the IIRIRA with 
Section 601] to provide asylum protection to persons persecuted by a forced abortion or 
sterilization.”). 
 236. Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 431–32 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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B.  The Fourth Circuit’s Acceptance of the Attorney General’s 
Interpretation of Section 601 Will Lead to an Unequal Application of 
the Law 
Because the Fourth Circuit found that only those who suffer a 
forced abortion or sterilization qualify as persecuted for these pur-
poses, immigration judges will apply Section 601 unequally.237  Clear-
ly, only women can undergo forced abortions.  But the disparity does 
not end there, as women also comprise a much larger percentage of 
those subjected to forced sterilization.238  Although men can be steri-
lized, China historically sterilized less than a third of husbands com-
pared to wives.239  This inconsistency is partially due to the belief in 
China that sterilization renders men weak.240  In addition, women are 
traditionally seen as being primarily responsible for using birth con-
trol.241
C.  The Yi Ni Court Erred in Agreeing with the Attorney General’s 
Opinion Because Section 601 Is Ambiguous and the Attorney 
General’s Interpretation Is Not a Permissible Construction of the 
Statute  
  Thus, China has a strong cultural incentive to focus its policy 
heavily on women, making it less likely that men can seek refuge un-
der Section 601 on their own merit following the Fourth Circuit’s de-
cision, despite the traumatic emotional and psychological harm they 
suffer. 
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s finding that “Congress unambi-
guously expressed the intent to cover only the specific individual who 
has undergone forced abortion or sterilization” under Section 601,242 
the statute ambiguously defines who is specifically protected under 
the INA and can show past persecution under China’s one-child poli-
cy.243  Under a Chevron analysis
 
 237. See Jamie Jordan, Ten Years of Resistance to Coercive Population Control: Section 601 of 
the IIRIRA of 1996 to Section 101 of the Real ID Act of 2005, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 
234 (2007) (explaining that the Chinese government monitors the entire female popula-
tion of child-bearing age, rewards neighbors for turning in pregnant neighbors, and im-
mediately forces women to use contraceptives after giving birth for the first time).   
, courts must defer to the administra-
tive agency’s interpretation when reviewing an ambiguous statute if 
 238. See Strawn, supra note 202, at 209 (comparing the data of men and women steri-
lized between 1979 and 1984). 
 239. See id. (“Between 1979 and 1984, 31 million women and 9.3 million men were steri-
lized, which represents almost one-third of all married couples in China.”). 
 240. Id. at 210. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 243. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
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the agency’s interpretation is permissible.244  In this case, the Attorney 
General’s interpretation was not permissible because legislative histo-
ry reveals that Congress intended the statute to include husbands.245
1.  Section 601’s Usage of the Word “Person” in Regard to Several 
Provisions That Apply to a Single Sex Is Ambiguous 
 
The Fourth Circuit should have found that Section 601 was am-
biguous on whether it extends to spouses.  Although the statute does 
refer only to a “person,” Congress used a gender-neutral term to de-
scribe who could be protected by the provision.246  Since it is women 
who undergo forced abortions and sterilizations, Congress may have 
used the gender-neutral term intending this protection to extend to 
both individuals and their spouses.247  Linking this gender-neutral 
term across no less than six embedded clauses,248 Section 601 is thus 
ambiguous because it refers to “a person” when discussing procedures 
that can only be applicable to one sex, and is confusingly linked to 
claims that can equally be raised by either a husband or wife.249  
Moreover, Congress did not define “persecution” to “exclude harms 
not personally suffered by an applicant.”250  Section 601 states only 
that “‘any person’ who ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution’ is ‘unable or unwilling’ to return to his or her country 
is entitled to asylum.”251  Under this provision alone, “there is no indi-
cation whatsoever of how personal or direct the harm or injury must 
be, only that persecution to an individual can merit asylum protec-
tion.”252
In fact, the government acknowledged that the statute was ambi-
guous in Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice.
  
253
 
 244. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
  There, the gov-
ernment conceded that Section 601 is ambiguous with regard to a 
husband’s authority to claim past persecution based on his wife’s 
 245. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 246. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 247. Carrick, supra note 223, at 209. 
 248. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 249. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Congress did not 
state that the harms must be “personally” suffered by the applicant, whether it be a man or 
woman, but that anyone with a well-founded fear of persecution could be entitled to asy-
lum in the United States). 
 250. Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 251. Id. at 328–29. 
 252. Id. at 329. 
 253. Id. at 316 (Katzmann, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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forced abortion or sterilization under the provision.254
2.  The Attorney General’s Interpretation of Section 601 Is Not a 
Permissible Construction Because Congressional Intent Shows 
That Section 601 Includes Husbands Who Are Forced to Limit 
Their Family to One Child 
  As even the 
government conceded that the statute is ambiguous, it was an error 
for the Fourth Circuit to find the statute was unambiguous. 
If a statute is ambiguous, then the court must move to the second 
prong of the Chevron analysis, where it must decide if the administra-
tive decision is a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute.  
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit should first have found the statute 
was ambiguous, and then found that the Attorney General’s interpre-
tation was not permissible.255  After giving deference to the Attorney 
General’s interpretation, the Court found the Attorney General’s ana-
lysis of the statutory language to be consistent with the rules of statu-
tory construction.256  The Attorney General concluded that, giving 
Section 601’s words “their ordinary or natural meaning,” “a person” 
referred only to the individual subjected to the procedure and not to 
spouses.257  He also asserted that Congress would have expressly said 
“spouses” if it wanted to include spouses in Section 601’s forced abor-
tion and sterilization clauses.258
This interpretation, however, ignores Congress’s intent to use 
Section 601 to expand the availability of asylum under the INA to vic-
tims of coercive population control policies.
   
259
 
 254. Id. 
  Contrary to the Attor-
ney General’s assertion, Section 601’s legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended to endorse earlier executive policies that granted 
asylum protection to those individuals who were subjected to forced 
 255. See id. at 327–28 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that it 
would be unreasonable to interpret Section 601 too narrowly in conflict with congressional 
intent). 
 256. Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 426 (4th Cir. 2010).  The court explained that it 
would be inconsistent to interpret the statute to encompass two people—a husband and a 
wife—as able to have an abortion.  Id.  (citing J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (A.G. 2008)).  
 257. J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 529. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (quoting 
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))). 
 258. Id. at 530. 
 259. Lin II, 494 F.3d at 328 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Section 601 
was, after all, expressly enacted to expand, not contract, the availability of asylum under § 
1101(a)(42) in the context of coercive population control programs.”). 
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abortion and sterilization procedure, as well as their spouses.260  In 
fact, two of Section 601’s sponsors reiterated that Congress intended 
Section 601 to extend refugee status and provide asylum to every vic-
tim of China’s one-child policy, including the spouses of individuals 
who personally underwent a forced abortion or sterilization proce-
dure.261
Additionally, Congress intended to include individuals “who have 
been submitted to undeniable and grotesque violations of fundamen-
tal human rights.”
   
262  With this intent in mind, Congress specifically 
indicated, when looking at the “individual burden” of proof, “that he 
or she has been subject to persecution—in this case, to coercive abor-
tion or sterilization—or has a well-founded fear of such treatment.”  
This would be a difficult standard for a man to prove because he 
would not undergo these procedures.263  Congress knows this fact and 
this therefore shows that the only applicants that Congress intended 
to exclude under Section 601 were those who “merely speculate that 
they will be so mistreated at some point in the future,” not the spous-
es of individuals who have already been harmed.264  Considering the 
mounting evidence, the Attorney General erred in narrowing the sta-
tute’s scope contrary to Congress’s intent, and thus, his interpretation 
is unreasonable.265
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
In Yi Ni v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
with the Attorney General’s narrow interpretation in J-S- and held that 
a husband could not establish persecution under Section 601 based 
solely on his wife’s forced abortion or sterilization procedure.266  This 
interpretation contradicts Congress’s original intent and could lead to 
vastly unequal applications of Section 601.267
 
 260. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) (clarifying that Congress’s intent in 
passing Section 601 was to provide asylum protection to those men, women, and couples 
whose human rights had been violated as part of China’s coercive family planning policy). 
  Instead, the court 
should have found that the statute was ambiguous and the Attorney 
General’s exclusion of spouses was an impermissible interpretation of 
 261. See Carrick, supra note 223, at 209. 
 262. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (A.G. 2008) (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 
(2004) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))). 
 266. Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 428, 431–32 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 267. See supra Part IV.B. 
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the statute.268  A husband is persecuted when he loses a child through 
a forced abortion or must watch his wife be subjected to a forced 
abortion or sterilization procedure.269
 
  Accordingly, a husband should 
be able to demonstrate persecution based on his wife’s forced abor-
tion or sterilization procedure under China’s one-child policy, there-
by qualifying for refugee status under Section 601. 
 
 268. See supra Part IV.C. 
 269. See supra Part IV.A. 
